back to that human will, and insist that it too, as a phenomenon, must have a cause of its operation, and the mode of it. It is by an intuition of our nature, that we are constrained on the occurrence of a phenomenon to believe in the existence of a cause. But we are not led by any such principle to deny that the phenomena of the will have a cause.

When, secondly, we resort to observation founded upon consciousness, this view is confirmed. We anticipate the voluntary actions of mankind as we anticipate their judgments. No doubt we are at times mistaken in the one case as in the other in our anticipations, but we do not in these cases conclude that the voluntary actions of mankind have had no cause, any more than we infer that their judgments have had no cause—we conclude merely, that we did not know the cause, and that if we had known the full cause, we could have certainly anticipated the result. There are statistics of the voluntary actions of mankind—as of crimes, for instance—which are as accurate as the laws of mortality. We say of a man who habitually commits mean and dishonourable actions, that his conduct proceeds from a mean and dishonourable mind; and unless some change take place, (of which there must be a cause,) we expect him to act in the same way in time to come. Or should this individual, at some particular time, do an honourable action, we still seek for some principle of honour remaining in the midst of his habitual meanness, and by which we would account for the apparent anomaly. In short, we rise from effects to causes; and from causes we anticipate effects, in regard to the will as in regard to everything else. Nor do we find our expectations disappointed. Mankind find the mind that is thoroughly honourable always acting a thoroughly honourable part. And this is the ground of the confidence which we put in our fellow-creatures. Were the will utterly capricious, as some suppose, then we

could put no confidence in a fellow-man ; nay, with reverence be it spoken, we could put no confidence in God himself. Mankind do, in fact, trust in a person known to be of thorough integrity, that he will always be upright. So far as we have fears that any given individual may commit a dishonest action, it is because we are not sure whether he is possessed of complete integrity. So far as we are deceived with any individual in whom we confided, it is not because his character has not brought forth its proper